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CASES NOTED
BLOOD BANKS, BAD BLOOD, AND
IMPLIED WARRANTY
The plaintiff contracted serum hepatitis as the result of a blood
transfusion. He sued the blood bank for breach of implied warranty.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, and plaintiff appealed. The
District Court of Appeal held, reversed and remanded: a plaintiff can
state a cause of action against a blood bank for breach of implied warranty, but can only recover for injuries if they were caused by failure
to detect or remove a deleterious substance capable of detection or removal. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So.2d 749 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1966).
Jurisdictions have generally refused to apply the laws of implied
warranty to the sale of blood on the theory that the administering of
the blood was but an incidental feature of the hospital's service.' Other
jurisdictions have enacted statutes to this effect.2 The precedent for this
aproach is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp.8 The plaintiff in that case

sued the hospital for injuries resulting from a transfusion of blood which
caused her to contract serum hepatitis. This was the first such action
based on the theory of implied warranty of fitness.' Previous actions for
similar injuries were usually supported by negligence allegations.5 In
Perlmutter, however, the New York court held that the. supplying of
blood was a "service" and not a "sale," and therefore the laws of warranty would not apply.0
1. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Whitehurst
v. American Nat. Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965); Balkowitsch v.
Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Hidy
v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 727, 143 N.E.2d 528, 163 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1957); Gile v. Kennewick Pub.
Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash.2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc.,
23 Wis.2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964); Diblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints
Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961).
2. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 36-1151 (1956) (furnishing of blood is a service and not a
sale), and CAL. HEALT & SAFETY CODE § 1606:
The procurement, processing, distribution or use of whole blood, plasma, blood
products, and blood derivatives ... shall be construed to be ... the rendition of a
service ... and is declared not to be, a sale....
3. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
4. See generally Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MINx. L. REV. 640
(1958).
5. Parker v. State, 280 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3d Dep't. 1952) (action for
negligence on the ground that physician should have been warned of the danger of hepatitis
virus). See also Merck & Co. v. Kidd, 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct.
15 (1957), where plaintiff argued that hepatitis virus in pooled blood was a violation of
Tennessee Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and hence negligence per se.
6. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 106, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1954).
The conclusion is evident that the furnishing of blood was only an incidental and
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Perlmutter was a 4-3 decision with a well reasoned dissent. It was
extensively criticized by all commentators, 7 but followed by the courts.'
Criticism of the decision centered on the "sale-service" dichotomy:
Regardless of the conclusion reached on the liability issue, the
court's opinion does a disservice by framing the issue in terms
of the "service" doctrine .... 9

Another commentator stated:
The effect of the instant case is to limit patients to their difficult task of establishing negligence. This is contrary to the
general trend of widening the bounds of hospital liability."°
The dissenters in Perlmutter argued:
We have held that where a person orders food in a restaurant
• . . it constitutes a sale to which the Personal Property Law
annexes an implied warranty that the food is reasonably fit for
consumption . . . [s]o it has been held with regard to drugs.
.. We cannot logically differentiate those decisions from the
one involved here .... 11
The dissatisfaction with the Perlmutter decision (the "sale-service"
dichotomy) stems from the failure of that court to face the crucial policy
considerations involved. 2 The simple question is, of course, who shall
bear the loss (blood bank, hospital, or patient) when hepatitis"8 is convery secondary adjunct to the services performed by the hospital and therefore was
not within the provisions of the Sales Act.
7. See Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MtNIN. L. REv. 640 (1958);
69 HARV. L. REv. 391 (1955); 37 NoTRE DAME LAW. 565 (1962); 29 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 305
(1955); 103 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1955).
8. Cases cited supra note 1.
9. 103 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 836 (1955).
10. 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 305, 309 & n.31 (1955). The same article went further:
The declaration by the legislature that a warranty is implied in the sale of goods
did not serve to make the fact of sale an inflexible element in the gravamen of the
complaint, but merely a circumstance which permits an action to be maintained.
Recognizing the tort history of warranty and the true nature of the action, it does
not seem proper to subject the essential condition of a sale to the same rigid scrutiny
it must undergo in other actions, purely ex contractu.
Id. at 309.
11. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 110, 123 N.E.2d 792, 797-98 (1954).
12. [AIrguments about "sale" or "service" seem to lead nowhere in this area. The
real question involved seems to be one of policy. . . . 42 MINN. L. REV. 640, 660
(1958).
See also 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 565, 568 (1962):
[T~he blood cases are quite out of line with the general trend of authority which
rejects the service sale dichotomy in the major area of food warranties and certainly plays it down in other areas. It is suggested that the findings of "no sale"
in the blood cases actually represent unconscious resolution of policy issues...
(Emphasis added.)
13. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDIcAL DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1962). Hepatitis--Inflammation of the liver of infectious or toxic origin. It is manifest by jaundice and in some
instances, liver enlargement. Fever and other systemic disorders are usually present.
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tracted as the result of a blood transfusion? The answer demands that
matters beyond the narrow issue of whether the transfusion is a sale or
a service be discussed. Policy considerations are essential. 4
The question is complicated by the fact that, at present, no means
have been devised to destroy the hepatitis virus in whole blood.' 5 The
problem was well stated in Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial
Blood Bank' where the court quoted from defendant's brief:
[T]he risk is inherent in every bottle of blood issued. The
problems of control are multiple; no donor's history is really
reliable; any donor may be an innocent carrier; no laboratory
test, or group of tests, is specific for the virus of hepatitis;
there is no way of treating the blood to kill the virus without
violating essential storage or safety requirements for whole
blood ...."I
It therefore appears evident that the courts, in Perlmutter and
similar decisions, have been reluctant to impose liability on the hospital
or blood bank, not because of the ficticious concept that a blood transfusion is not a "sale," but rather because there is no means available
to detect the harmful virus. Subsequent cases articulated this concern
and made it clear that this was the primary motive behind their decisions.' 8 The inherent weakness of Perlmutter therefore, is that the court
14. See Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So.2d 749, 752 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966):
In light of this patent concern for the public policy involved in this question we
feel compelled to depart from the "sale versus service" category . . . expressions of
sound policy preferences are more in harmony with the doctrine with which we
will be dealing.
15. 9 TRAWuATic

MEDIcaNE

&

SURGERY

FOR THE

ATToRNEY 110 (Cantor ed. 1963).

It is estimated that one transfusion in three hundred results in a case of hepatitis
which can be recognized ...

the death rate is about 6 per cent .... Hepatitis does

not appear to be a preventable complication of blood transfusion. Any donor with
a history of the disease or recent contact with the disease is eliminated. Units of
blood with jaundiced plasma are also eliminated. This means that transmitters of
the disease are healthy people who are unaware that they harbor the virus. It has
not been possible to destroy the virus in whole blood. It can be destroyed in plasma
only by prolonged incubation ... attempts to kill the virus by other methods have
been unsatisfactory, those which kill the virus also injure the plasma proteins.
16. 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
17. Id. at 807.
18. The subject case is perhaps the most explicit:
It is evident from our research that although many of the decisions denying recovery
for breach of implied warranty are based on the technical distinction between a
service and a sale, the factor underlying the decisions is the inability, in the present
state of medical knowledge, to detect or remove the virus which causes serum
hepatitis.
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., supra note 14, at 752. (Emphasis added.)
Earlier decisions also made it clear that the "sale-service" dichotomy was not their
major concern: Bakowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, supra note 16, at
810: "[I]t would be unrealistic to hold that there is an implied warranty as to qualities of
fitness of human blood on which no medical or scientific information can be acquired. ....
";
Diblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085, 1087
(1961): "We do not say that hospitals should be immune from negligence. But we do not
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never voiced this concern. By relying on the "sale-service" dichotomy 9
it gave
a "slick" solution which never came to grips with the real problem. 20
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,21 however, began rather
than ended, with "sale" versus "service." The court decided that the
sale of blood by a blood bank was a "sale, 22 and then went on to discuss
the real questions involved. 2 8 Despite the fact that it "found no case in
which such a warranty has been implied," 24 the court held that
"the law
'25
of implied warranties applies to the transaction before us."
This courageous thinking brought the court face to face with the
problem that "regardless of the amount of inspection or care . . . the
defect of serum hepatitis virus cannot be eliminated."'2 6 A different holding on the warranty question (in accord with precedent) would have
made a confrontation with this problem unnecessary.
Therefore, once implied warranty has been allowed, there seems
think they should be strapped with an insurability of blood purity, absent negligence.";
Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash.2d 774, 779, 296 P.2d 662, 667 (1956): "[11t
appears ... that the hospital district's negligence was the proximate cause . ..and that the
same negligence caused the breach of warranty."
19. See note 12 supra.
20. The court may have tipped its hand as to the real basis of its opinion in this passing
remark:
Informed opinion is at hand that there is neither a means of detecting the presence
of the jaundice producing agent in the donor's blood nor a practical method of treating the blood to be used for transfusion so that the danger may be eliminated ...
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp. 308 N.Y. 100, 106, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954). This remark was quoted in Russell, supranote 14, at 751.
The dissenters in Perlmutter also seized upon this remark. After quoting it in full they
commented on the majority's dismissal of the complaint:
Thus they rely upon so called medical reports which are neither in the record
nor even mentioned in the briefs-matter which plaintiff has had no opportunity
to rebut either by evidence or by argument-indeed, plaintiff is now prevented from
furnishing any evidence whatever.
Id. at 111, 123 N.E.2d, at 796.
21. Supra note 14. Note that since Perlmutter dealt with a hospital and Russell a blood
bank, the decisions may be reconciled. But the reasoning in Russell would seem to apply
equally well to a hospital as to a blood bank:
It seems to us a distortion to take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into
the shape of a service, and then employ this transformed material in erecting the
framework of a major policy decision.
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., supra note 14.
22. We will now proceed to the real questions involved in this appeal, which are
whether there are any implied warranties attached to the sale of blood by a blood
bank, what these warranties might be, and whether these warranties run to the ultimate consumer.
Ibid.
23. Id. at 753.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
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to be no alternative but to hold the blood bank liable. This has been the
stumbling block to other courts. Unable to surmount it, they were forced
to follow Perlmutter.
The Russell case, however, was more imaginative. The court pointed
out the parallel between the sale of blood and the sale of certain drugs
which are excepted from strict liability because they are "therapeutic
products, which, in the present state of human knowledge, are incapable
of being made absolutely safe for their intended and ordinary uses. 2 7
This doctrine enabled them to distinguish the sale of blood from the sale
of tobacco in the Green v. American Tobacco Co.2" decision which held
that the "seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a
defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability
on the theory of implied warranty."'2 9
This "unavoidably unsafe" category was first recognized by the
Florida Supreme Court in McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co." in which the
court cited the Restatement of Torts8 as authority in refusing to hold
a druggist liable for breach of implied warranty when a drug produced
harmful effects on the purchaser. Under this theory, if the blood cannot
be made safe the suit must fail. "This position," says Russell, "is entirely reasonable, as well as being good public policy."82 Accordingly, the
mistake of Perlmutter8 was not repeated: the complaint was allowed,
and the court went on to say that "before the product can be termed
'unavoidably unsafe,' there will have to be some factual showing that it
84
cannot be made safe.
Thus the court has arrived at a position where, in order to be successful, the warranty action must prove something akin to negligence:
[W]e have reached a point in which we are stating that a plaintiff can state a cause of action against a blood bank for breach
of warranty, but can only recover for injuries if they were
caused by the failure to detect or remove a deleterious sub27. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., supra note 14, at 754.
28. 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963). Green is "especially ominous" says the Russell court.

Id. at 753.
29. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.?d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963). Quoted in Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., supra note 14, at 753.
The Green court also stated at 171:
No reasonable distinction can, in our opinion, be made between the physical or
practical impossibility of obtaining knowledge of a dangerous condition, and scientific inability resulting from a current lack of human knowledge and skill ...
30. 174 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
31. RESTATEMENT (SEtcoN), TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965):
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
32. 185 So.2d, at 754.
33. See dissenters' remarks regarding dismissal of complaint. Supra note 18.
34. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., supra note 14, at 754.
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stance capable of detection or removal. Admittedly this language goes right to the threshold of a suit for negligence.... 8,, 5
But the distinction between the two actions was succinctly revealed:
[T]he difference between an action in negligence and one in implied warranty when dealing with a product "unavoidably unsafe" is to shift the burden of proof."
This is so because:
[A] complaint for negligent failure to inspect places the onus
upon plaintiff to prove the manufacturer negligent ... [whereas] [f]or breach of implied warranty . . . plaintiff must only
show that the product was transferred from the manufacturer's
possession while in a defective state, and as a result of the defect, the plaintiff was injured.8
Then a final caveat:
[P]roof that the defect in blood is undetectable and unremovable would be a defense to breach of implied warranty. However the burden of this proof would be on the blood bank.38
A decision which skirts the issue does a disservice. In the subject
case the court met the problems head on, and carved out law that will
endure beyond the time when a means is devised for detecting the serum
hepatitis virus in blood. 89 When such a means is discovered, other jurisdictions even though they feel that perhaps the blood bank should be
liable, may still be reluctant to apply the theory of implied warranty,
for by so doing they will be forced to reverse their artificial notion that
the sale of blood is not a "sale." In Florida, fortunately, the march of
science will not so soon outmode the law. When the means of detecting the
serum hepatitis virus is ultimately discovered, blood will no longer be
classified as an "unavoidably unsafe product." That defense gone, the
consumer-patient will find his just relief under the theory of implied
warranty.
JOHN FROST WALKER

35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.
39. Indeed, that time is near. See Berland, New Gains in the War on Hepatitis, Today's
Health, Aug. 1966, p. 20, 73-74:
An even more effective approach-perhaps a final answer-is now being refined ....
Dr. Allen remembered . . . that patients who . . . received stored, safe plasma several months before getting whole blood transfusions never came down with hepatitis . . . (t)he safe plasma, given first, had made them immune . . . . The result,
says the California surgeon, is that patients can be given hepatitis protection much
as children are now given protection against measles: by simultaneous inoculation
of tame viruses and strong antibodies.

